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ABSTRACT 
 
Japan is one of most innovative drug manufacturer-friendly 
countries because it revised its patent and drug regulation systems 
for providing patent and non-patent incentives for new use and 
treatment R&D based on its pro-patent and pro-medical science 
policies. This article provides an overview of the pharmaceutical 
industry and examines patent and non-patent incentives for drug 
R&D in focusing on incentives for developing new uses of and 
treatments for known drugs from a comparative law perspective. 
After discussing the difficulties in establishing infringement and in 
obtaining injunctions against generic drug manufacturers who 
infringe new use product patents, the article reviews measure 
Japanese scholars have proposed to help secure incentives for new 
use and treatment R&D and proposes an alternative solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
* Toshiko Takenaka is Washington Research Foundation/W. Hunter Simpson 
Professor of Technology Law at the University of Washington School of Law.  
From April 1, 2016, she will be a professor at Keio University Law School 
through a joint appointment with UW. 
1
Takenaka: The Patent and Non-Patent Incentives for Research and Development
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017
220 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL 12:3 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction      220 
I. The Pharmaceutical Industry in Japan  222 
II. Non-Patent Incentives     226 
A. Relationship to Patent Incentives   226 
B. The Regulatory Approval Process and Data 
Protection      227 
III. Patent Incentives     231 
A. Patentability of New Uses for Known Products 231 
B. Patent Term Extension    234 
C. New Use Patent Infringement Remedies  238 
Conclusion      243 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Professor Benjamin Roin 1  argues that the current legal 
infrastructure in the United States for patent and non-patent 
incentives is designed to promote new drug development and that, 
without a mechanism to enforce new use patents, it creates a large 
gap among the incentives for pharmaceutical innovations.  Data 
protection for a new use of a previously approved drug is limited to 
three years, which is substantially less than the five years provided 
for new drugs that contain new chemical entities.2  Because of the 
inherency doctrine, in the United States, pharmaceutical firms can 
only obtain a method patent for a new use of an existing drug.  New 
use method patents are difficult to enforce because patients directly 
infringe the patents by taking a known drug for a patented use.  Drug 
manufacturers are only secondarily liable for active inducement.  
Medical practitioners who might be liable for active inducement are 
                                                                                                             
1 Professor Benjamin Roin is one of our esteemed panelists in the Future of 
Innovation in Medicine Symposium.  For his argument, Benjamin Roin, 
Solving the Problem of New Uses, Draft of October 14, 2016 
(https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2016/10/Solving-the-Problem-of-New-Uses-
Ben-n.-Roin.pdf) 
2 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). See also 21 C.F.R. § 
314.108 (2016). 
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exempted from patent infringement liability under the U.S. Patent 
Act. 3   Moreover, because of active ingredient limitations, U.S. 
patentees cannot take advantage of patent term extension (P.T.E.) 
provisions.4 
Japan provides more incentives for new use Research & 
Development through both patent and non-patent protection.  The 
Law on Securing Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Products including 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices (L.P.M.D.) provides up to six 
years of data protection for a new use of a previously approved 
drug.5  The Japanese Patent Law (J.P.L.) allows product patents on 
new uses to facilitate enforcement against drug manufacturers, 
patent term extensions on new uses, and dosage regimes for existing 
drugs.  The Japanese government has adopted pro-patent and pro-
medical science policies.  Despite the exclusive rights afforded new 
uses of drug products, the government is concerned about 
insufficient incentives for medical science innovations.  This 
concern results from excluding medical methods from patentability 
due to a lack of industrial applicability under the JPL even if medical 
methods are protected indirectly through a patent on a drug product 
being limited by its use.6  The Japanese government organized a 
committee to examine the impact of the exclusion and innovative 
measures to secure incentives for new uses and dosage regimens of 
known drugs.  
This article provides an overview of the pharmaceutical 
industry, in light of the Japanese government’s patent and science 
policy changes.  It examines patent and non-patent incentives for 
drug R&D and focuses on incentives for developing new uses of and 
treatments for known drugs from a comparative law perspective.  
Finally, this article discusses the difficulties in establishing 
infringement and in obtaining injunctions against generic drug 
                                                                                                             
3 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). See also Timothy J. Lithgow, Patent Infringement 
Immunity for Medical Practitioners and Related Health Care Entities, 37 
Jurimetrics 251 (1997).  
4 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(1). 
5Iryohin, Iryokiki no Hinshitsu, Yukousei oyobi Anzensei no Kakuhonado ni 
Kan’suru Hōrtsu  [The Law on Securing Quality, Efficacy and Safety of 
Products including Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices], Law No. 84 of 
2013, Art. 14.4 [hereinafter “L.P.M.D.”].  
6 Tokkyohō [Patent Act], Law No.121 of 1959, art. 29. For a discussion on the 
exclusion of medical methods under JPL, see infra note 50.   
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manufacturers who infringe new use product patents. Furthermore, 
it reviews measures Japanese scholars have proposed to help secure 
incentives for new use and treatment R&D. 
 
I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 
 
The Japanese pharmaceutical market is the second largest in the 
world.7  However, industry analysts think that the role that Japanese 
firms play in the global pharmaceutical market is limited, compared 
with the roles that Japanese firms play in the electronics and 
automobile industries.8  In the 1950s and 1960s, the government 
capital control policy protected Japanese drug manufacturers from 
competition from foreign drug manufacturers.9  The capital control 
policy, combined with tariffs and product standards, effectively 
prevented the entry of foreign firms into the Japanese market.  
Pharmaceutical products were excluded from patent eligible subject 
matter until the J.P.L. was revised in 1976.10  Before the revision, 
only a method of manufacturing and using a pharmaceutical product 
was patent eligible.  Due to this gap in patent protection, Japanese 
drug manufacturers could make and sell drugs developed in foreign 
countries at a relatively low cost. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese drug manufacturers began to 
invest in new drug R&D as the government began to remove non-
tariff barriers via deregulation and open the Japanese market.11  In 
                                                                                                             
7 Accessing the Japanese Generic Pharmaceutical Market, THOMSON REUTERS 
(2014), 
http://thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/pharma-
life-sciences/case-study/newport-case-study-japanese-generics.pdf. 
8 In rankings based on sales in 2014, Takeda is ranked 16th globally and the 
highest among Japanese firms. Waseem Noor, Pharma Exec’s Pharma 50 
2014, PHARMEXEC (June 9, 2014), http://www.pharmexec.com/pharm-
execs-pharma-50-2014. 
9 Shinji Takagi, Japan’s Restrictive System of Trade and Payments: Operation, 
Effectiveness, and Liberalization, 1950-1964, (International Monetary 
Fund,  Working Paper No. 97/111, 1997), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97111.pdf.  
10 See Tokkyohotō no Ichibu wo Kaiseisuru Horitsu [Law for Revising Patent 
Law and Other Acts], Law No. 46 of 1975. 
11 Maki Umemura, Globalisation and Change in the Japanese Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 1990-2010, in COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION: 
4
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1987, the J.P.L. was revised to introduce a P.T.E. system that 
recoups the patent term. During this time, innovative drug 
manufacturers cannot market their patented drugs due to delays in 
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (M.H.L.W.)’s drug safety 
examinations. 12   With the increased investment and additional 
patent protection, Japanese drug manufacturers began to develop 
new drugs in the 1990s.  The Japanese government adopted a pro-
medical science and patent policy, which enhanced this trend.13  In 
2003, the Basic IP Law was enacted to create the IP Strategy 
Headquarters in the Cabinet, which began to publish annual strategy 
programs that charged ministries and agencies, particularly the 
M.E.T.I. (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and the J.P.O. 
(Japan Patent Office), with implementing action plans to enhance 
patent protection.14   
In 2006, Professor Shinya Yamanaka, an adult stem cell 
researcher, and his research team successfully generated induced 
pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells).  His research began to attract the 
attention of the Japanese community, who eagerly awaited news of 
Professor Yamanaka’s Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine.15  
In 2008, the IP Headquarters tasked the M.E.T.I. and the J.P.O. to 
review the J.P.L. in order to enable Japanese life science industries 
to commercialize Professor Yamanaka’s research in regenerative 
medicine and other types of translational research in medical 
science.16  
                                                                                                             
BRITISH AND JAPANESE ENTERPRISE 204 (M. Umemura and R. Fujioka eds., 
2012).  
12 For more discussions on the PTE system, see infra note 39.  
13 For a general discussion of the Japanese government’s pro-patent policy, see 
Toshiko Takenaka, Success or Failure? Japan’s National Strategy on 
Intellectual Property and Evolution of Its Impact from the Comparative 
Law Perspective, 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 379 (2009). 
14 Chitekizaisan Kihonhō [Intellectual Property Basic Act], Law No. 122 of 
2002.  
15 The Nobel Assembly at Karolinska Institutet, The Novel Prize in Physiology 
or Medicine 2012 (Oct. 8, 2012).  
16 See Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, Intellectual Property 
Strategic Program 2008, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY 
HEADQUARTERS (2008), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/keikaku2008_e.pdf. For the function 
of Headquarters in IP law and policy making in Japan, see Toshiko 
5
Takenaka: The Patent and Non-Patent Incentives for Research and Development
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017
224 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL 12:3 
 
 
Currently, due to its streamlined reimbursement mechanism 
under the national health insurance system Japan is an attractive 
market for drug manufacturers. In Japan, after an innovative drug 
patent expires, the generic drug market share was significantly less 
than in the U.S. market but has significantly increased with the 
incentive through reimbursement of the national insurance system.17  
Japanese drug manufacturers are highly ranked by the sales in 
Japanese market,18 but a significant portion of Japanese drugs are 
made and imported from European countries.19  U.S. also lagged 
behind on the trade balance because drugs are made in countries 
where corporate tax is low.20 Furthermore, the global market sales 
and new drug development of Japanese drug manufacturers exhibit 
                                                                                                             
Takenaka & Ichiro Nakayama, Will Intellectual Property Policy Save Japan 
from Recession? Japan’s Basic Intellectual Property Law and Its 
Implementation through the Strategic Program, 35 IIC 877 (2004) 
[hereinafter, Takenaka, IP Policy].  
17 According to the statistics available from IMS Health, MIDAS, Market 
Segmentation, the market share of generic drugs in the United States was 
more than 90% in contrast to less than 40% in Japan in 2010. Iyakuhin 
Sangyō Bijon 2013 Shiryō [Vision of Medical Product Industry: 2013- 
Materials], MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (2013) [hereinafter, 
2013 Vision Material], 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/seisakunitsuite/bunya/kenkou_iryou/iryou/shinkou/
dl/vision_2013b.pdf.  The share was increased to 56.2 percent as of 
September 2015. Kōhatsu Iyakuhin no Shiyou Sokushin nitutite [Regarding 
Promotion of Generic Drug Use], MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & 
WELFARE (2013), 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/kenkou_iryou/iryou/kouha
tu-iyaku/) [hereinafter, Generic Drug Share Promotion].  
18 2013 Iyakuhin Kigyo Uriage Ranking [2013 Drug Manufacturers’ Ranking by 
the sales], MEDISEARCH (2013), 
http://www.medisearch.co.jp/doukou_kakukaihatuhi.html 
19 New Vision for the Pharmaceutical Industry-Aiming at the Industry with 
International Competitive Power taking the Mission of Innovation, 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (Aug. 30, 2007) [hereinafter 
MHWL 2007 New Vision Report], 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/iryou/shinkou/dl/01_0001.pdf.    
20 Iyakuhin Sangyō Kyōka Sōgōsen’ryaku Sankō Shiryō [Strategies for 
Pharmaceutical Product Industry Promotion, Reference Materials], 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (Aug. 30, 2007),   
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-10807000-Iseikyoku-
Keizaika/0000096429.pdf. 
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a significant lag compared to U.S. and European drug 
manufacturers; only 16 percent of new active ingredients granted 
market authorization in the Japanese market between 2008 and 2011 
were developed by Japanese drug manufacturers.21  
In 2014, the government promulgated the Law to Promote 
Healthcare and Medical Strategy to establish the Office of 
Healthcare and Medical Strategy Promotion in its Cabinet, which 
should promote R&D in the healthcare and medical industry.22  This 
new law should overhaul Japan’s drug industry and healthcare 
system through deregulation, and it provides more opportunities for 
foreign drug manufacturers in the Japanese market by easing 
regulatory guidelines.23  Currently, Japan’s national strategy focuses 
on medical science innovations, as well as on promoting health and 
active aging.24 This strategy benefits innovative drug manufacturers 
because it provides government funds for R&D in medical science. 
It also benefits generic drug manufacturers by adopting various 
measures to promote generic drug penetration through 
implementing the MHLW’s 2013 roadmap, 25 wherein the 
Healthcare Office set a target of cutting five trillion yen from 
healthcare expenditures by 2025.26 
                                                                                                             
21 See 2013 Vision Material, supra note 17 at Shiryō 20.  
22 Kenkō Iryō Senryaku Suishinhō [Law to Promote Healthcare and Medical 
Strategy], Law No. 48 of 2014.  
23 Ames Gross, Japan’s Growth Strategy Promotes Medical and Healthcare 
Reform, MEDTECH INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.medicaldevicesummit.com/RegulatoryCompliance/Features1/Ja
pans-Growth-Strategy-Promotes-Medical-and-Health-2086.aspx. 
24 Japan Revitalization Strategy Revised in 2014, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN 
AND HIS CABINET (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/honbunEN.pdf. 
25 Kōhatsu Iyakuhin no Saranaru Shiyosokushin notameno R ōdomappu nituite 
[Regarding Roadmap for Further Promotion of Generic Drugs], MINISTRY 
OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (April 5, 2013),  
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000002z7fr.html.  
26“Kokumin no Kenkōjumyō wo Enshinsuru Shakai” ni Muketa Yobō-Kenkō 
Kanri ni Kakawaru Torikumino Suishin ni Tusuite [Promotion for Measures 
of Preventive Medicine and Health Management toward “Society for 
Japanese Citizens to Prolong Their Active Age”], MINISTRY OF HEALTH, 
LABOR & WELFARE (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/0000019326.html.  The government also 
aims to increase genetic drug market share to more than 80% by 2018.  See 
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II. NON-PATENT INCENTIVES 
 
A.  Relationship to Patent Incentives 
 
Government agencies heavily regulate drug marketing and 
production. In Japan, the M.H.L.W. and Pharmaceuticals and 
Medical Device Agency (P.M.D.A.) regulate drug marketing under 
the P.M.D.27  The level of drug development necessary to file a new 
drug market authorization involves high risk and intensive 
investment in R&D; the new drug approval success rate is 0.006 
percent, and the average development cost is 50 billion yen. 28  
Funding for innovative drug manufacturers heavily relies on 
revenue from marketing exclusivity over a newly approved drug.  
Both patent and data protection provide marketing exclusivity; these 
protections prevent generic drug manufacturers from accessing 
clinical data developed by the innovative drug manufacturers, which 
is necessary for market approval of generic drugs.   
Notably, innovative drug manufacturers cannot likely take 
advantage of the full patent term because patent applications are 
filed as soon as the active ingredient’s utility is established, and the 
patent term expires twenty years from the filing date. 29  
Furthermore, drug manufacturers may require three to ten years to 
complete clinical trials and develop the data necessary to file a new 
drug application, which is a substantially longer process than the 
patent prosecution process at the J.P.O.30  Moreover, the P.M.D.A. 
                                                                                                             
supra note 17, Generic Drug Share Promotion.  
27 PMDA was established to conduct scientific reviews of drug and medical 
devicemarket approvals in 2004 as an independent administrative agency 
under Dokuritsu Hōjin Iryōhin Iryōkiki Sōgōkikōhō [Independent 
Administrative Agency Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency Law] 
Law No. 192 of 2002).  
28 MHRL 2007 New Vision Report, supra note 19, at 28.  
29 Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law No.121 of 1959, art. 67.  
30 The average period between filing a request for examination and the first 
office action is less than a year.  Tokkyo Gyōsei Nen’ji Hokokusho 2014 
[Patent Administration Annual Report 2014], JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (2014), 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/nenji/nenpou2014_xls.htm.  A 
request for examination must be filed within three years from the filing 
date. See Japanese Patent Law Art. 43-3(1).  
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may require an additional year to review applications.31  A P.T.E. 
system is necessary for innovative drug manufacturers to recoup this 
pre-approval patent term, during which manufacturers cannot 
market their patented drugs. Furthermore, because generic drug 
manufacturers can rely on the expensive clinical data developed by 
innovative drug manufacturers, which reduces the necessary time 
and cost for full safety and efficacy studies, they are prevented from 
using the clinical data for various time periods, depending on the 
type of drug.  As a result, patent protection and data protection are 
intertwined with the regulatory approval process. 
 
B.  The Regulatory Approval Process and Data Protection 
 
In Japan, the regulatory approval process begins by filing a new 
drug market approval application with the P.M.D.A.  The 
application must include clinical data necessary for the P.M.D.A. to 
establish the new drug’s efficacy and safety.  The cost of developing 
the necessary data is not only expensive, but also involves high risk, 
because the new drug must be tested on human subjects to establish 
efficacy/effect and safety.  The M.H.L.W. only issues a disposition 
of market approval when the P.M.D.A. finds that all standards are 
met.32    
A disposition, a document issued for a market approval, 
identifies a drug through its active ingredients, efficacy quantities, 
dosage form, routes of administration, additional details on its 
manufacturing process, and effective period.  When a drug 
manufacturer intends to sell a product that differs in its details from 
the previously approved disposition, it must file another application 
that includes the partial variations from the prior disposition. In 
short, a drug manufacturer is only authorized to market the drug 
identified by the dispositions.  Thus, a new application is necessary 
to market a previously approved drug if it is used for a new use or 
                                                                                                             
31 See Toshiki Sugita, Recent Trends and Special Topics in New Drug Review in 
PMDA, 2 Generics and Biosimilars Initiative Journal 99 (2013).  
32 For the new drug application review procedures at the PDMP, see 
Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, JAPAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (JPMA) (2015) 
[hereinafter “Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan”], 
http://www.jpma.or.jp/english/parj/pdf/2015.pdf. 
9
Takenaka: The Patent and Non-Patent Incentives for Research and Development
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017
228 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL 12:3 
 
 
treatment.   
As discussed above, regardless of patent protection, the United 
States and some other countries, including Japan, provide an 
additional market exclusivity term by preventing generic drug 
manufacturers from accessing clinical trial data developed by new 
drug manufacturers.   In Japan, the post marketing surveillance 
(P.M.S.) period system provides such additional protection.  This 
protection is available not only for a new drug, but also for a new 
use of a previously approved drug.  
To sell generic versions of previously approved drugs, generic 
drug manufacturers must also file an application with the P.M.D.A. 
for market approval.  A generic drug features the same active 
ingredients, efficacy/effect, quantities, and dosage as a previously 
approved drug.33  Thus, generic drug manufacturers can skip the 
expensive efficacy and safety clinical trials because they can rely on 
the data developed by the innovative drug manufacturer for the 
previous approval.  Generic drug manufacturers must only establish 
stability and bioequivalence between the generic drug and approved 
drug .34  The period needed to develop such data is two to three 
years, which is much shorter than is needed for new drug approvals.  
However, generic drug manufacturers cannot receive market 
approval until the P.M.S. period ends, even if the P.M.D.A. finds 
that all the standards are met.35   
The P.M.S. was introduced in 1979 and is aimed at ensuring 
drug efficacy and safety after the drugs are sold. 36   Although 
provision of additional protection to innovative drug manufacturers 
                                                                                                             
33 Jenerikku Iyakuhin heno Gimon ni Kotaemasu [Answering Questions about 
Generic Drugs], MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE (July 2012), 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/iryou/kouhatu-iyaku/dl/02_120713.pdf.  
34 Iyakuhintō no Tokkyoken no Sonzokukikan no Enchō Tōroku Seido oyobi Sono 
Unyō no Arikata [The Best Practice for Patent Term Extension regarding 
Drug and other Products], INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Feb., 
2015) [hereinafter, IIP, Best Practice],  
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/chousa/pdf/zaisanken/2014_09.pdf.  
35 Yukiko Ozaki, Abstract of Dissertation: Iyakuhin Sangō Shijō niokeru Shijō 
Dokusenken ni kansuru Kosatsu [Study of Market Exclusivity in the Drug 
Product Market], INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE STRATEGY HITOTSUBASHI 
UNIVERSITY (Mar., 2010) [hereinafter “Study of Market Exclusivity”], 
http://www.ics.hit-u.ac.jp/jp/phd/article_ozaki.pdf.  
36 Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, supra note 32, at 73.  
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was not the original aim, the P.M.S. provisions function in the same 
manner as data protection under the Hatch-Waxman Act.37  The 
original P.M.S. period was only two years, but has since been 
extended, as intellectual property protection has strengthened with 
adoption of the IP-based national strategy. 38   Under the current 
rules, the P.M.S. period varies depending on the type of approved 
new drug: (1) four to six years for previously approved drugs with a 
new use or dosage; (2) six years for new prescription drugs and 
drugs with new routes of administration; (3) eight years for drugs 
that include new active ingredients; and (4) ten years for orphan 
drugs.39  As a result, drug manufacturers who developed a new use 
for a previously approved drug enjoy revenue from an exclusive 
market for a maximum of six years from the date of the drug’s 
approval. This period of data protection is independent of patent 
protection.40 
In the United States, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a unique 
framework that prevents generic drug manufacturers from 
infringing patents held by innovative drug manufacturers, while 
encouraging generic drug manufacturers to challenge such patents.41  
Under this framework, filing a U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) marketing application with a certification stating that the 
unexpired patent is invalid or unenforceable, constitutes patent 
infringement. The patentee can file a patent infringement suit 
against the generic drug manufacturer that filed the application.42  
Generic drug manufacturers receive marketing exclusivity for 180 
                                                                                                             
37 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Public Law 
98-417 [hereinafter, “Hatch-Waxman Act”].  For further information on the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s history and goal, see Margo A. Bagley, Patent Term 
Restoration and Non‐Patent Exclusivity in the United States (Aug. 1 2011) 
(Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2011-25) 
[hereinafter “Patent Term Restoration”], http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899533.  
38 Study of Market Exclusivity, supra note 35, at 5. For a discussion of IP based 
national strategies, see supra note 16, Takenaka, IP Policy. 
39 Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, supra note 32, at 82.  
40 Drug Re-Examination/Data Exclusivity in Japan and Neighboring Countries, 
AIPPI Forum & ExCo Workshop, JPMA (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.aippi.org/download/helsinki13/presentations/Pres_Pharma_4_
Yokumura_300813.pdf.  
41 Patent Term Restoration; supra note 37, at 5. 
42 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)-(iv). 
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days if they win the patent litigation.43   
Neither the P.M.D. nor the J.P.L. provides such a dispute 
resolution framework that links patent protection and the regulatory 
approval process.  In practice, under its administrative purview, the 
P.M.D.A. requires generic drug manufacturers to provide patent 
information related to the approved drug when they file a market 
approval petition.44  If the P.M.D.A. finds a potential patent dispute, 
it contacts the patentee/innovative drug manufacturer and requests 
the patent information. The P.M.D.A. refuses to authorize market 
approval if the patent is directed to the active ingredient of the 
generic drug.  The P.M.D.A used to authorize market approval if the 
patent was not directed to the active ingredient but only to a use of 
the generic drug.  This practice was changed in 2009 when the 
P.M.D.A. adopted a skinny label practice.   Under this practice, if a 
patent is directed to a use or dosage but not the active ingredient of 
the generic drug, a disposition is issued for the generic drug, 
excluding the patented use or dosage. 45   Thus, generic drug 
manufacturers are unable to sell drugs indicating the patented use or 
dosage.   
 
                                                                                                             
43 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug 
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Guidance for 
Industry 180 Generic Drug Exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA (June 
1998), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.  
44 IIP, Best Practice, supra note 34, at 33.  The administrative guidance, Gyōsei 
Shidō, is a Japanese government practice under the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1993 in which an administrative agency provides to a 
party guidance, recommendation, advice, and other acts that may be sought 
to implement the administrative aim.  
45 Tsutatsu [Notice] No. 065001, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR & WELFARE 
(June 5, 2009), https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/entyou-
wg05_shiryou/sankou_2.pdf#search='%E8%96%AC%E9%A3%9F%E5%
AF%A9%E6%9F%BB%E7%99%BA%E7%AC%AC0605014%E5%8F%B
7.  See  also, Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan, 
supra note 32 at 16.  For a discussion of the skinny label practice under 
U.S. Patent Act, see Herman H. Yue & John D. Garretson, Skinny Labeling 
after Hospira v. Burwell: An End-Run Around Pharmaceutical Method of 
Use, FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTITUTE (July/August 2015), 
http://fdaimports.com/docs/solving_or_compounding_the_problem.pdf.  
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III. PATENT INCENTIVES 
 
A. Patentability of New Uses for Known Products 
 
Under the J.P.L., a known product may meet the novelty and 
inventive step requirements if: (1) the product features an inherent 
function or property and (2) is limited to a use based on the function 
or property, so long as the inherent use is unknown and 
unpredictable to one skilled in the art of the invention, at the time 
the patent application is filed. 46  The J.P.O. applies a special rule to 
products in unpredictable arts, such as chemical compounds, to 
determine novelty and inventive step.  Even if the J.P.O. examiners 
find that a product described in a claim under examination is 
expressly or implicitly disclosed in a reference, the unpredictable art 
special rule prevents the examiners from citing the reference, unless 
the reference meets the enablement requirement for the disclosed 
subject matter. 47   Courts require the J.P.O applying a high 
enablement standard for citing a reference in unpredictable arts. A 
reference must include sufficient information, such that one skilled 
in the art of the invention will “readily” understand how to make 
and use the disclosed subject matter in light of the technical common 
knowledge at the time of patent application.48  Therefore, a claim 
directed to a product in the unpredictable arts meets the novelty 
requirement, even if detailed structures of the product are disclosed 
in a reference, so long as no use or manufacturing process for the 
product is known to one skilled in the art at the time the patent 
application is filed. 49   Examiners can cite such reference in 
combination with another reference for failing to meet the inventive 
step to show that a use or manufacturing process for the product is 
                                                                                                             
46 Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law No.121 of 1959, art. 29(1)-(2). 
47 Tokkyo Jitsuyo Shin’an Shin’sa Kijun [Exam Guidelines for Patent and Utility 
Model in Japan], JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (Sept. 2015) (see Part III, Chapter 
2, 3.1.1(1)b) [hereinafter JPO Examination Guidelines], 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/1312-002_e.htm. See also 
Shimako Kato, Kagakubun’ya niokeru Shinposei no Kangaekata 
[Examination of Inventive Step on Inventions in the Chemical Field], JAPAN 
PATENT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION (2008) (see 61 Patento (No. 10) 86).  
48 Tokyo Kotō Saibansho [Tokyo High Court] October 16, 1986, Sho 59 (Gyo 
ke) no. 303.  
49 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 47, at Part III, 3.1.1.(1)b  
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obvious to one skilled in the art of the invention. 
This special rule is particularly relevant in determining the 
novelty and inventive step for patent protection of medicinal 
inventions because materials such as chemical compounds in 
medicinal inventions are in the unpredictable art.    The rule applies 
to claims directed to a new medical use of a known chemical 
compound based on discovering a property of the compound. The 
J.P.O. established an examination practice to deny patentability to 
method claims directed to use of a drug product for medical 
treatment, based on a lack of industrial applicability.50  Instead, such 
use is patentable as a product used for treatment because a product 
patent can be enforced against drug manufacturers.51  The J.P.O. has 
published special guidelines on medical inventions.  The 
introduction to the J.P.O.’s Medicinal Invention Guidelines defines 
‘material’ as a “a component used as an active ingredient, including 
a compound, a cell, a tissue and a chemical substance (or a group of 
chemical substances) whose chemical structure is not specified, 
such as an extract from a natural product, and a combination thereof 
[hereunder, an ‘active ingredient component’].” 52   Under the 
Medicinal Invention Guidelines, J.P.O. examiners cannot cite a 
reference to reject a claim directed to an active ingredient 
component limited by a particular use, unless the reference includes 
sufficient information that one skilled in the art could understand 
not only the particular use for the component, but also a process for 
making the component.53  An examiner can only cite a reference that 
fails to disclose the particular use limited to the active ingredient 
                                                                                                             
50 Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] April 11, 2002, Hei 12 (gyo ke) 65.  
Hanrei Jihō No. 1828, 88. For a general discussion on patentability of 
medical method under the JPL, see Yusuke Sato, Patent Protection of 
Medical Methods—Focusing on Ethical Issues—From Current Situation 
and Problems on Intellectual Property Law, Annual of Industrial Property 
law, June 2007, 20 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol’y J. 125, 129 (Jiameng Kathy Liu 
trans., 2011). 
51 Shoichi Okumura, JAPAN PATENT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, BIO-SCIENCE 
COMMITTEE TŌSHINSHO (Feb. 10, 2012) (see page 8) [Hereinafter, 
“Okumura Bio-Science Committee”], http://jpaa.or.jp/seisaku/pdf/F1-
11.pdf.  
52 Tokkyo Jitsuyoushinhan Handobukku [Examination Handbook for Patent 
Utility Model], Japan Patent Office (Annex B, Chapter 3), 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/Guidelines/7_3.pdf 
53 Id. at 2.2.2 (2). 
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component for an inventive step-based claim rejection. However, 
examiners must cite another reference to show that the particular use 
of a claimed product is predictable or obvious to one skilled in the 
art. 
The J.P.O.’s special unpredictable art rule significantly differs 
from the inherency doctrine under U.S. case law.  Under the 
inherency doctrine, U.S.P.T.O. examiners can cite a reference 
disclosing a product  to reject a claim directed to a product in the 
unpredictable art for a novelty (anticipation) rejection, even if the 
reference does not disclose a property or function as long as the 
property and function are necessarily present in the disclosed.54  The 
J.P.O.’s inherency doctrine also significantly differs from the U.S. 
inherency doctrine because the U.S. doctrine does not require that a 
reference disclose sufficient information for one skilled in the art to 
recognize the presence of a natural result, as long as the reference 
meets the enablement requirement for the process.55 Discovery of a 
new use or purpose for a product cannot prevent an anticipation 
rejection, as long as the product is structurally identical to an old 
product, and, thus, applicants cannot rely on an inherent claim 
feature to distinguish a product in the prior art at the U.S.P.T.O.56  
This case law eliminates patents for known products, whether or not 
an application discloses a new and nonobvious use, based on 
discovery of an inherent function and property.  As a result, only a 
method patent is available for a new use of a known product as long 
as the use is new and nonobvious. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
54 For a general discussion on the inherency doctrine, see, i.e., Janice M. Mueller 
& Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation 
Doctrine, 45 Hous L. Rev. 1101 (2008); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Inherency, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371 (2005); Bradford J.  Duft & Eric P. 
Mirabel, Principles of Inherency, 77 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 539 
(1995).  For a general discussion of the product of nature doctrine, see John 
M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the 
Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 
85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 301 (2003). 
55 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
56 Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11 (1892). 
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B. Patent Term Extension 
 
Under the J.P.L., owners of new use patents can request a patent 
term extension to recoup the patent protection period lost while 
waiting for market approval.57  The objective of Japan’s patent term 
extension (P.T.E.) system is set forth under the J.P.L. as follows: 
 
Where there is a period during which the patented invention 
is unable to be worked because approvals prescribed by 
relevant Laws that are intended to ensure the safety, etc. or 
any other disposition designated by Cabinet Order as 
requiring considerable time for the proper execution of the 
disposition in light of the purpose, procedures, etc., of such 
a disposition are necessary to obtain for the working of the 
patented invention, the duration of the patent right may be 
extended, upon the filing of a request for the registration of 
extension of the duration, by a period not exceeding five 
years.58  
 
To request an extension, innovative drug manufacturers 
must file a P.T.E. application and may receive a patent rights 
extension that does not exceed five years if the application does not 
fall into one of grounds for rejecting a request for patent term 
extension. 59   One of such grounds is “where the disposition 
designated by Cabinet Order is deemed unnecessary for working of 
the patented invention which is under the examination for P.T.E.”60  
The J.P.L.’s P.T.E. provision did not clarify the definition for 
“working” the patented invention in connection with the 
“disposition”. However, the scope of the drug is limited by the 
claims, which differs from market approval of a drug, which is 
limited by the disposition description. 
The “unnecessary disposition” ground for rejection led to 
considerable uncertainty in the scope of the market approval 
disposition for P.T.E.s.  The J.P.O. has a long-established 
examination practice of granting patent extensions for new uses of 
                                                                                                             
57 Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law No.121 of 1959, Art. 67 (2) [hereinafter JPL]. 
58 JPL, Art. 67(2).  
59 JPL, Art. 67(2), 67-2.  
60 JPL, Art. 67-2(1)(i).  
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known drug patents. However, it interpreted the grounds for 
rejection in a manner that that denies P.T.E. applications for patents 
directed to a new dosage and administration of a known drug for a 
known use.  Innovative drug manufacturers have challenged the 
J.P.O.’s interpretation.  In Genentech v. the JPO, the Intellectual 
Property High Court of Japan (IP High Court) sided with the 
patentee and struck down the J.P.O.’s interpretation by reversing the 
J.P.O.’s rejection of Genentech’s P.T.E. application.61  Instead, the 
IP High Court adopted an interpretation that entitles drug 
manufacturers to a patent term extension—even if the ingredients, 
use, and efficacy/effect are identical—as long as the quantity and 
dosage differ.  This interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court 
of Japan.62   
As a result, patent owners are given P.T.E. incentives with 
an opportunity to recoup the portion of the patent term sacrificed for 
market approval due to changes in the ingredients, use, 
efficacy/effect, quantity and dosage from the previous approval.  
However, the scope of exclusivity for an extended patent may be 
narrower than the scope defined by the claim. In dicta, the IP High 
Court stated in Genentech that a patent extension directed to an 
active ingredient can exclude a drug product defined by not only (1) 
the ingredients, use, and efficacy/effect included in the claim, but 
also (2) quantity and dosage not included in the claim, but only 
described in a subsequent disposition. 63  The IP High Court also 
stated that the extended patent may exclude equivalents of the drug 
product defined by these elements in the claim and subsequent 
disposition.64  This dictum led to considerable uncertainty in the 
exclusive scope of patent extensions.65 
                                                                                                             
61 Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 30, 2014, 
Hei 25 (gyo ke) no. 10195, Hanrei Jiho No. 2232, 3,  
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/hanrei/g_panel/index.html [Hereunder “IP 
High Court Genentech decision].  
62 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 17, 2015, Hei 26 (gyō hi) no. 356, 69 Saiko 
saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 1912, Hanrei Jiho No. 2309, 127.  
63 Supra note 61, IP High Court Genentech decision. 
64 Id. 
65 Tokkyosken Sonzoku Kikan Enchō ni kansuru Chizai Daigougi Hanketsu 
nituite [Regarding the IP High Court’s Grand Bench Decision on Patent 
Term Extension], JAPAN GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 
(May 29, 2015), http://www.jga.gr.jp/wp-
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This IP High Court interpretation of P.T.E. eligibility in 
Genentech based on a subsequent market approval differs markedly 
from the patent extension system in the United States.66  The U.S. 
Patent Act 67  includes active ingredient limitations that prevent 
innovative drug manufacturers from obtaining P.T.E.s on new 
technologies associated with pre-approved drugs that include the 
same active ingredients.68  When approval is granted to a combined 
drug product, the product must include at least one ingredient that 
was not previously approved for a P.T.E. grant.69  The scope of 
patent extensions for active ingredient claims is broader than a 
Japanese patent extension; it not only includes the product specified 
in the market approval, but also products with the same active 
ingredients, and any salts or esters of the ingredients.70 
The IP High Court’s eligibility interpretation is more consistent 
with the European Union’s patent extension system, which relies on 
a Supplemental Protection Certificate (S.P.C.) under the EU S.P.C. 
Regulations.71  Similar to the J.P.L., the EU S.P.C. Regulations may 
grant multiple S.P.C.s for drug products with the same active 
ingredients.  The EU S.P.C. Regulations prevent drug manufacturers 
                                                                                                             
content/uploads/2015/05/efe7b8ac2da1edf77e9ca08f23f2a6d3.pdf.  The IP 
High Court’s grand bench tried to clarify the scope in Debiopharm Int’l v. 
Touwa Yakuhin, Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High 
Ct.] Jan. 20, 2017, Heisei 28 (ne) no. 10046. The grand bench held that the 
extended patent can exclude products which are substantially the same as 
the drug products defined by the claim and subsequent deposition.   
66 35 U.S.C. § 156.   
67 Title 35 U.S.C. 
68 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(1). 
69 Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions on the Patent Term 
Restoration Program, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 22, 
2015), 
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistan
ce/ucm069959.htm.  
70 Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories. Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
71 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the 
creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, 
1992 O.J. (L 182) 2; Regulation (EC) No. 1610/96 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for plant protection products, 1996 O.J. (L 198) 8 
[hereinafter SPC Regulations]. For a comparative study on patent term 
extension systems, see IIP, Best Practice, supra note 34, at 91.                                      
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from obtaining  S.P.C.s on drug products if (1) the authorization 
granted to a drug product is not the first authorization72 or (2) an 
S.P.C. has already been granted to the drug product.73  However, the 
Court of Justice for the European Union (C.J.E.U.) has interpreted 
the conditions to not preclude an S.P.C. grant for a new use of a drug 
product, even if the drug product includes the same active ingredient 
previously authorized for another use. 74  Although the C.J.E.U. 
suggests that an S.P.C. may not be available if the patent under 
examination based on a subsequent market approval includes a prior 
patent for which an SPC was granted based on a prior market 
approval; a prior market approval does not completely prevent 
innovative drug manufacturers from obtaining another S.P.C. on the 
same drug, regardless of the identity of the active ingredient.75  
Although the C.J.E.U.’s eligibility interpretation differs from the 
United States’ approach, the S.P.C. scope is similar to the United 
States’ approach. An S.P.C. enjoys the same scope of exclusivity as 
the scope of the original patent.76  If a patent that has been granted 
an S.P.C. is directed to a product, the scope includes any drug 
product with the same active ingredient, regardless of additional 
active ingredients or uses of the product.77  The scope of S.P.C. 
exclusivity not only includes the active ingredient described in the 
authorization, but also its derivatives, such as salts and esters, that 
fall within the scope of the patent that was granted the S.P.C.78  This 
scope is broader than the extended patent scope under the J.P.L. 
because the extended patent scope only includes the drug product 
described in a subsequent disposition. However, the IP High Court 
has suggested that the scope may include equivalents of such 
approved drug products. 
                                                                                                             
72 SPC Regulations Art. 3(c).  
73 SPC Regulations Art. 3(d).                                                      
74  Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) Ltd v Comptroller-General of Patents, Case 
C-130/11 (Euro. Ct. of Justice Jul. 19, 2012) .  
75 Edward Oates, Neurim judgment of European Court of Justice liberalises SPC 
system, AIPPI E-NEWS (Sept. 2012), 
https://www.aippi.org/enews/2012/edition26/Edward_Oates.html. 
76 SPC Regulations, Art. 5.  
77 Novartis AG v Actavis UK Ltd,  Case C-442/11 (Euro. Ct. of Justice Feb. 9, 
2012).  
78 Farmitalia Carlo Erba Srl., Case C-392/97 (Euro. Ct. of Justice Sept. 16, 
1999).   
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C. New Use Patent Infringement Remedies   
 
Despite the patent-friendly view of the P.T.E. system, new use 
patents are difficult to enforce, even if a patent issues on a drug 
product instead of a method under the J.P.L.  Strong public policy 
for keeping post-patent expiration products in the public domain 
prevents courts from granting an injunction against such products.  
Under the J.P.L., a product patent can exclude others from making, 
using, assigning, exporting, importing, and offering to assign the 
product.79  An exception applies to product patents, the scope of 
which is limited by a new use. This is because the new use 
distinguishes the prior art product, which is structurally identical to 
the claimed product.  To maintain the prior art product in the public 
domain, the creation, assignment, exportation, and importation of 
the product should be free from patent protection, so long as the 
product use is not the patented use. 80  In other words, a patentee 
must establish that the product made or sold by an alleged infringer 
will be used for the patented use.  
Due to the burden necessary to establish use, a new use drug 
product patent functions more like a method patent, which excludes 
acts of using a method of treatment.81  Under current case law which 
is supported by the majority of legal commentators,  a patentee can 
meet the burden when it shows that the product is sold with a 
description, which indicates that the product is used for the patented 
                                                                                                             
79 See JPL Art. 2(3)I; Art. 68.  Scholars view the nature of new use drug product 
inventions as method inventions.  See Hiroshi Yoshida, Yōtohatsumei ni 
kan’suru Tokkyoken no Sashitome Seikyū no Arikata – “Mono”ni 
Chakumoshikushita Handan karra “Mono”ni Chakumokushita Handane 
[Appropriate Injunction for Patent Infringement of New Use Invention: 
From the Focus on “Product” to the Focus on “Person”], 16 Chiteki Zaisan 
Seisaku Kenkyu 167, 173 (2007), 
http://lex.juris.hokudai.ac.jp/coe/pressinfo/journal/vol_16/16_5.pdf  
[hereinafter, “Yoshida, Appropriate Injunction”].  
80 Shimako Kato, Yōto Hatsumei oyobi Yōto Genteiwo Fukumu Hatsumeino 
Kenrikōshi nikan’suru Ichikōsatsu [A Study of Enforcement of Patents on 
Use Inventions and Inventions Limited by Use], in CHITEKI 
ZAISANHONO ATARASHII NAGARE [New Trends in Intellectual 
Property] 189 (2010) [hereinafter “Kato, A Study of New Use Patent 
Enforcement”].  
81 Tokkyohō [Patent Act] Law no.121 of 1959, art. 2(3)ii, art. 68.  
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use.82 This description is included in a package insert attached to the 
drugs or containers, as required under the P.M.D.. The package 
insert must include dosage, administration, and other necessary 
precautions and information necessary to the use and handling of the 
drugs.83 The P.M.D.A. skinny label practice requires that the insert 
be clear with respect to the exclusion of patented use or dosage.  
However, prior to the adoption of this skinny label practice, when 
the insert expressly or implicitly indicated a patented use or dosage, 
the drug product infringed a new use patent.  In the Ketotifen 
Fumarate case, which was decided before the P.M.D.A. adopted its 
skinny label practice, the Tokyo District Court found that the 
patentee met the burden for showing that the drug will be used for 
the patented use, even if the package insert did not expressly indicate 
the patented use. 84   The court held that the patented use, the 
prevention of allergic asthma, was implicitly indicated in the 
package insert when the document included descriptions indicating 
that (1) the drug is for treating bronchial asthma and (2) the drug is 
not administered for trachea expansion during an asthma attack, but 
is regularly administered daily.85 
When a patented use is not included in a package insert, courts 
may find an infringing use based on the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the creation and sale of the drug product at issue.   
In the Ketotifen Fumarate case, the Tokyo District Court 
emphasized that infringement must be determined based on whether 
an accused product falls within the patent scope by considering the 
asserted claim, and the written description and drawings in light of 
the general knowledge of one skilled in the art.  Thus, although the 
defendant secured market approval on the patented use under the 
P.M.D., this fact did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
product was used for the patented use.86  
In the Cilostazol case, the IP High Court found that a drug was 
                                                                                                             
82 Kato, A Study of New Use Patent Enforcement, supra note 80, at 192.  
Japanese scholars use “label theory” to find limit infringement of new use 
patents to the circumstances where a package insert indicates a patented use.  
83 See L.P.M.D. Art. 52-1. See supra note 5. 
84 Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 23, 1992, Hei 2 (wa) 12094. 
24 Chiteki zaisanken kankei minji, gyōsei saiban reishū. [Chiteki Saishū] 
805, Hanrei Jiho No. 1469, 139. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
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used for a patented use, even though the scope of the defendant’s 
market approval did not include the patented use, because the 
defendant emphasized that the patented use encourages doctors to 
participate in clinical trials.87  Thus, it is likely that Japanese courts 
are willing to find infringement under some circumstances to 
support a drug being used for a patented use, even if a patented use 
is clearly excluded from the disposition and a package insert clearly 
excludes the patented use under the post-2009 skinny label practice. 
Even with a finding of infringement, courts may be willing to 
grant an injunction against drug sales, but are reluctant to grant an 
injunction against manufacturing if a product has both infringing 
and non-infringing uses.  In the Ketotifen Fumarate case, the Tokyo 
District Court granted an injunction against the defendant to stop the 
sale of the drug product, despite its non-infringing use for treating 
bronchial asthma.88  The prosecution record supported the notion 
that the original claims included the non-infringing use, but were 
limited through an amendment, which indicated that only the 
allergic asthma prevention use was covered to overcome prior art.89  
The court explained that the broad scope of the injunction was 
necessary because it was impossible to distinguish infringing and 
non-infringing uses of the drug product.  However, the court did not 
grant an injunction against the party making the Ketotifen Fumarate 
compound because the compound alone has non-infringing uses 
before it is processed as a drug product.  Patent law scholars 
criticized the broad scope of the injunction granted by the Tokyo 
District Court. 90  
                                                                                                             
87 Chiteki Zaisan Koto Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] Nov. 21, 2006, 
Hei 17 (ne) 10125. This is not a patent infringement case but an employee 
invention compensation case in which an employee sued his employer for a 
reasonable compensation.  Whether the employer worked a new use patent 
invented by the employee was an issue in calculating reasonable 
compensation for the employee because the JPL provides for mandatory 
compensation to work an invention when the right of the invention is 
transferred from an inventor to his employer.   JPL Art. 35.  
88 Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 23, 1992, Hei 2 (wa) 12094. 
24 Chiteki zaisanken kankei minji, gyōsei saiban reishū. [Chiteki Saishū] 
805, Hanrei Jiho No. 1469, 139. 
89 Id. 
90 Patent scholars criticize this broad injunction scope.  E.g., Mimura Ryoichi, 
Tokkyohan’I no Kaishaku to Keizaikatsudou no Jiyū [Construction of Patent 
Claim and Freedom of Commercial Activities], Bessatsu NBL No. 120, 217 
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Although using a drug product for a patented use constitutes 
infringement, such use is exempted from infringement liability 
when a patient takes the drug product for the patented use. This is 
because the J.P.L. requires that a patented product is used for 
business purposes to find infringement liability, which, then 
excludes private uses.91  Courts do not typically find that doctors 
and pharmacists are secondarily liable through the indirect 
infringement theory because courts emphasize that strong policy 
favors maintaining freedom in medical practice to provide patients 
with the best treatments.92  In all aspects of their medical practice, 
doctors should be exempted from patent infringement liability, 
regardless of a patent.  Pharmacists should also be protected from 
liability as long as their activities constitute preparing a drug in 
accordance with a prescription prepared by a medical doctor.93 
Further, suing generic drug manufacturers for indirect 
infringement is difficult because the J.P.L. does not afford an 
infringement claim for acts equivalent to active inducement under 
the U.S. Patent Act. 94   When an accused product has a non-
infringing use, patentees must establish the following: (1) the 
product is used for the patented product use; (2) the product is 
indispensable for solving the problem of the patented method; (3) 
the defendant knew of the asserted patent; and (4) the defendant 
knew that the product would be used to infringe the patent.95  Courts 
are divided as to the interpretation of the indispensable requirement; 
certain courts require novelty to consider the product 
indispensable.96  This view precludes indirect infringement liability 
for a new use product patent because the drug product is a known 
product, and thus, does not meet the indispensable requirement.  
Other courts do not require novelty and find a product indispensable 
if the product is necessary to solve a technical problem of the 
                                                                                                             
(2007).  
91 JPL Art. 68. See Toshiko Takenaka et al., Patent Enforcement in the US, 
Germany and Japan 265 (2015).  
92 Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] April 11, 2002, Hei 12 (gyo ke) 65, 
Hanrei Jiho No. 1828, 99. 
93 JPL Art. 69(3).  
94 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
95 JPL Art. 101 iv.  
96 E.g., Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] April 23, 2004, Hei 14 (wa) 
6035 Hanrei Jihō No. 1982, 89. 
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invention.97   Even with this perspective, establishing that a product 
is indispensable remains difficult because the product may not solve 
the technical problem independent of its use, which was illustrated 
in case on a new treatment delivery.98 
Generally, establishing infringement of a new use product patent 
and obtaining an injunction against making, assigning, importing, 
and exporting infringing products remains difficult.  Thus, securing 
incentives for market exclusivity through data protection remains 
important.  The current maximum six-year P.M.S. period for 
previously approved drugs with a new use or dosage is essential for 
securing such incentives for new use R&D.  Under the P.M.D.A. 
practice, generic drug manufactures cannot receive market approval 
for a patented use until the patent expires.  Because the patented use 
is excluded from market approval, the burden should be shifted to 
generic drug manufacturers to show that the description in the 
package insert clearly excludes the patented use to avoid an 
injunction against drug products.  The Tokyo District Court’s 
approach in the Ketotifen Fumarate case suggests this burden shift, 
based on the notion that distinguishing infringing and non-infringing 
uses is impossible.   
Innovative drug manufactures can argue that patent incentives 
for new use and treatment R&D are insufficient because of the 
difficulties in obtaining injunctions.  Certain Japanese scholars 
propose that a right to compensation should be established for 
medical treatment inventions and that a right to injunctive relief 
should be eliminated. 99   This proposal might be difficult to 
implement due to the difficulties in compensation calculation and 
the high cost to administer compensation.  Instead, an injunction 
should be granted to prevent the production and sale of unpatented 
drug products if: (1) a description clearly avoids a patented use or 
(2) the totality of circumstances indicates that drugs are made solely 
for a patented use, despite a description in the package insert. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
97 E.g., Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.], September 
30, 2005, Hei 17 (ne) 10040, Hanrei Jihō No. 1904, 47.  
98 Kato, A Study of New Use Patent Enforcement, supra note 80, at 199. - 
99 Yoshida, Appropriate Injunction, supra note 79, at 231.  
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     CONCLUSION 
 
Japan is one of most innovative drug manufacturer-friendly 
countries because it revised its patent and drug regulation systems 
for providing patent and non-patent incentives for new use and 
treatment R&D based on its pro-patent and pro-medical science 
policies.  Fundamental patent policies for maintaining unpatented 
products in the public domain and securing doctors’ freedom of 
medical practice to provide the best medical treatments limit the 
remedies available for infringement of new use product patents.  To 
enhance dispute resolution between innovative and generic drug 
manufacturers without involving patients, doctors, and medical 
practitioners, Japanese courts should use their discretion to flexibly 
define the scope of an injunction. Such scope should reflect to a fine 
balance on competing interests between securing incentives for new 
use and treatment R&D and allowing freedom for generic drugs to 
enter in the market. 
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